International Journal of Game Theory

Aims & Scope

International Journal of Game Theory is devoted to game theory and its applications.

It publishes original research making significant contributions from a methodological, conceptual or mathematical point of view.

Survey articles may also be considered if especially useful for the field.

View Aims & Scope

---

Metrics & Ranking

Impact Factor

Year	Value
2025	0.4
2024	0.60

SJR (SCImago Journal Rank)

Year	Value
2024	0.337

Quartile

Year	Value
2024	Q2

h-index

Year	Value
2024	49

Journal Rank

Year	Value
2024	15497

Journal Citation Indicator

Year	Value
2024	64

---

---

Abstracting & Indexing

Journal is indexed in leading academic databases, ensuring global visibility and accessibility of our peer-reviewed research.

• Scopus
• Google Scholar
• Web of Science

---

Subjects & Keywords

Journal’s research areas, covering key disciplines and specialized sub-topics in Decision Sciences, Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Mathematics and Social Sciences, designed to support cutting-edge academic discovery.

---

Most Cited Articles

The Most Cited Articles section features the journal's most impactful research, based on citation counts. These articles have been referenced frequently by other researchers, indicating their significant contribution to their respective fields.

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games

  Citation: 2054

  Authors: R.

• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria

  Citation: 1396

  Authors: Robert W.

• Cores of convex games

  Citation: 1214

  Authors: Lloyd S.

• The assignment game I: The core

  Citation: 1150

  Authors: L. S., M.

• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games

  Citation: 638

  Authors: H. P.

• Cooperative games with coalition structures

  Citation: 623

  Authors: R. J., J. H.

• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points

  Citation: 602

  Authors: John C.

• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information

  Citation: 493

  Authors: Jean -François, Shmuel

• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

  Citation: 466

  Authors: R. B.

• Conference structures and fair allocation rules

  Citation: 464

  Authors: R. B.

---